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Abstract – This paper examines the problem of managing fraud in emerging 
converged networks and presents work in progress on implementing a rules based 
fraud detection system for deployment in a testbed environment. This is done by 
examining the state of the art in telecoms fraud management and adapting this to 
emerging IP-based networks and services. Features of this fraud detection 
implementation include the use of flexible data formats and spreadsheet/workbook-
based rules specification with the capability to apply arbitrarily complex rules. 
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1 Introduction 
The ongoing convergence of voice and data traffic, together with migration of traditional 
telecommunications services to packet switched networks based on the Internet Protocol (IP), 
necessitates investigation of major issues related to service delivery, quality of service (QoS), 
usage based accounting, and security. Security issues include securing access to services, 
securing the accounting process and securing the communications themselves. Fraud 
management, the focus of this paper, combines aspects of accounting with aspects of security, 
and is in our view of great importance in an emerging environment where services are 
numerous, diverse and potentially short-lived and where users can expect quality guarantees 
but will need to pay for them. 
Even in the circuit switched telephony environment, which arguably is well protected against 
fraud due to highly restricted access, revenue loss through fraudulent activity is often valued 
by service providers at between 3% and 8% of turnover [1], amounting worldwide to tens of 
billions of euros per annum. It is very likely that emerging IP-based services will provide 
even greater opportunities for fraud, due to the use of multi-layered, open protocols and their 
lack of built-in security mechanisms (with IPv4 at any rate). 
Indeed, IP-based telecommunications networks will be susceptible to the same security 
problems that are inherent in any IP network. As access to IP networks is largely unrestricted 
and IP fraud may be performed from multiple points in the network simultaneously, the 
successful detection and management of this activity requires constant exchange of 
information between several network elements, devices, and interfaces, followed by much 
comparison and analysis. 
This paper investigates techniques for gathering fraud indication data and processing it 
according to user-specified rules so that suspected fraud can be discovered and acted upon. A 
spreadsheet workbook-based approach is proposed for flexibly handling rules specification.  
2 Problem statement 
Fraud management is a very general issue, which we can define as including the following: 
• Fraud prevention: the enforcement of strict access and usage controls to ensure that fraud 
cannot take place. 
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• Fraud detection: real-time or non-real-time observation of indicators (mainly service 
usage metrics) and determination of whether fraud is taking place or has taken place. This 
usually triggers some action, such as blocking access to the service or generation of a 
notification.  
• Fraud reduction: recognising that fraud prevention is almost impossible in practice, 
ensuring that it happens rarely and that its effects are minimised. This usually requires 
real-time detection. 
Fraud prevention (or at least minimisation) is an essential part of the design of services for 
deployment on emerging networks. Fraud prevention usually depends on the implementation 
of standard security facilities like authentication of identity and policy-based authorisation, 
and involves some kind of a priori processing. Significant work on securing access to 
charged services has been undertaken by the Authentication, Authorization and Accounting 
(AAA) Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task Force [2]. 
The central problem that we address in this paper is that of a posteriori processing in order to 
detect fraud – accepting that, despite the enforcement of strict controls, there remains the 
possibility of fraud. This processing takes place either while a service is being used or some 
time afterwards. Figure 1 shows the context of this fraud detection. 
Inputs to this fraud detection process, discussed in more detail below, include usage data 
gathered from the currently active service, historical usage data, customer/user profile 
information and a set of fraud detection rules that are to be applied to this data. These fraud 
detection rules might be tailored to individual services, individual customers, or both. 
Outputs from the fraud detection process can be one or more of: 
• A Boolean value, indicating whether or not the current service usage is considered 
fraudulent; 
• A quantitative measure indicating the likelihood of fraud; 
• An updated customer/user profile, to be used as input to future fraud detection activity. 
• Updates to historical data that is maintained on service usage 
Handling of these outputs is beyond the scope of this paper. A determination of fraud would 
normally need to trigger some action, ideally in real time, possibly generating an alert within 

























Figure 1: The Fraud Detection process in context 
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3 Design Approaches  
There is a significant body of published work on telecommunications fraud detection, mostly 
addressing circuit-switched second-generation mobile networks. This section seeks to adapt 
this work, and some additional relevant work on network intrusion detection, to emerging 
converged networks. 
The main design issues that we can identify for a fraud detection system are the following: 
• Identification and management of fraud indicator data 
• Collection and representation of usage data 
• Processing of activity data – i.e. the rules engine 
• Specification and maintenance of rules 
• Deployment (distribution of logic, performance, scalability) 
Each of these is now discussed individually. 
3.1 Identification and management of fraud indicator data 
The first step in designing a fraud detection system is to analyse the type of data that is 
available for monitoring so that fraud indicators can be identified. There are two major 
categories of such data. Firstly, data is normally available for each individual service usage, 
often summarised in the form of toll tickets or call detail records (CDRs) that are created for 
billing purposes. This data may or may not already be rated (i.e. have charges applied). 
Service usage data may also be available from various kinds of log files that are maintained 
for performance monitoring, or specifically for the purposes of fraud detection. Secondly, a 
fraud detection system should have access to persistent data that is not directly related to the 
“current” service usage. This includes data from customer management systems as well as 
historical usage data, which can be potentially vast. A major challenge is to store and access 
this kind of data as efficiently as possible. 
As mentioned, indicators of fraud are usually available from service usage or network 
monitoring records. Various kinds of usage-based indicators are discussed by Burge et al in 
[3], including usage indicators, related to how a service is used (e.g. frequency of use), 
mobility indicators, related to the mobility of the originating device or person, and deductive 
indicators that arise as a by-product of fraud (e.g. overlapping calls). Indicator data may be 
available immediately after a service usage has begun, ideally enabling fraud detection while 
the service is being used, or only after service usage has been completed, as is the case with 
circuit switched telephony’s CDRs that are often intended for batch processing. 
Fraud indicators are also available from customer management systems – i.e. individual user 
profiles. Data from a particular service usage instance can then be combined with the user’s 
personal profile to indicate the likelihood of fraud. It is envisaged that profiling of individual 
users can greatly increase the power of fraud detection. This may be done by building up a 
picture over time of each customer’s service usage, and perhaps other information, like the 
customer’s credit rating. Cahill et al in [4] argue for the tracking of each account’s own 
activity, and propose the use of a signature to represent this in an efficient way. This 
signature is kept current by the use of a decay mechanism, whereby recent data is afforded 
greatest significance. The extent to which separate data is maintained on each individual user 
has an effect on performance and scalability. At one extreme, we could have simple 
classification of users, while at the other we could have highly individualised data, perhaps 
by allowing customers to define their own profiles. This has the advantage of actively 
involving the user in fraud minimisation. 
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3.2 Collection and representation of usage data 
As mentioned, the records most commonly monitored for fraud indicators in circuit switched 
telephony are CDRs. A CDR usually contains information about a completed telephone call 
or call attempt and is used for billing purposes.  
In our fraud detection design, we choose to represent service usage data with Internet 
Protocol Detail Records (IPDRs), in accordance with the IPDR organisation’s Network Data 
Management – Usage (NDM-U) specification [5]. The NDM-U specification is a 
generalisation of the CDR idea, and it can be used for all kinds of diverse services. The IPDR 
organisation is an industry consortium, founded by several prominent vendors of 
management solutions for IP-based networks and services. The main objective of the IPDR 
organisation is “to define the essential attributes of information exchange between network 
elements and services, operation support systems and business support systems” [6]. The 
specifications are based on the core functional roles and interfaces of the TeleManagement 
Forum’s Telecom Operations Map (TOM) [7] 
There are several reasons for adopting the NDM-U specification for fraud management for 
IP-based networks and services: 
• IPDR NDM-U is an industry-wide specification. CDRs are generated by telephone 
switches, usually in a format that is specific to the switch vendor. Though there has been 
some attempt to standardise formats (e.g. GSM’s Transferred Account Procedure for 
exchange of usage data between roaming partners), billing and fraud detection systems 
have generally had to be tailored to specific formats. 
• The IPDR structure specifies a generic, flexible record format for exchanging usage 
information in a multi-service environment. CDR formats are generally quite static. 
• IPDR provides an extension mechanism so that additional, optional, usage metrics may 
be exchanged for a particular service, or even a particular service usage instance. 
• IPDRs can be used for exchanging any kind of usage data, not just data on completed 
calls. For example, IPDRs can be generated periodically while a service is being used to 
enable near real-time billing (and fraud detection). 
• IPDRs are self-descriptive and human-readable, based on eXtensible Markup Language 
(XML), allowing for more straightforward integration into diverse systems. Figure 2 
shows a sample IPDR for a telephone call. 
A potential drawback with the IPDR model is that, in common with most self-describing text-
based specifications, it is not the most efficient way to represent data. Efficiency can be 
improved however with the use of native XML databases as well as XML compression. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<IPDRDoc xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
docId="SMH_20030224143129+0100_24194" 
xmlns="http://www.ipdr.org/namespaces/ipdr" IPDRRecorderInfo ="recorder.acme.net"> 
 <IPDR xmlns="http://www.ipdr.org/namespaces/ipdr"> 
  <seqNum>3462</seqNum> 
  <IPDRCreationTime>2003-04-28T08:53:05Z</IPDRCreationTime> 
  <serviceType>fixedLineTelephony</serviceType> 
  <serviceProviderID>AcmeTelecom</serviceProviderID> 
  <ANumber>050679390</ANumber> <!- Calling Party --> 
  <BNumber>1891110110</BNumber> <!- Called Party --> 
  <startTime>2003-04-28T08:50:00Z</startTime> 
  <duration>185</duration> <!- Duration in Seconds --> 
  <CE xmlns="http://www.ipdr.org/namespaces/ipdr"> 
   <charge>0.062</charge> <!- €.02 per minute --> 
  </CE> 
 </IPDR> 
</IPDRDoc> 
Figure 2: Sample fixed-line telephony IPDR 
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Of course, not all data of interest for fraud detection will be available in IPDR format. Thus, 
one of the required subsystems of our fraud detection system is a mediation component that is 
responsible for pre-processing data with appropriate correlation and aggregation, and 
presenting IPDRs to the rules engine. 
3.3 Processing of activity data 
Published work on fraud and intrusion detection generally takes one (or both) of two 
approaches: rules based detection and/or “intelligent” methods using neural networks, data 
mining or case based reasoning. These approaches differ in their ease of use, adaptivity, 
complexity and performance. In this paper, we focus on rules based techniques. 
With rules based detection, usage data is verified against specified rules. These rules may be 
absolute or differential. The former are based on simple thresholds, which may or may not be 
customer-dependent. The latter are based on observed statistical anomalies, the identification 
of which can be based on customer profile, time of day or other factors. A statistical anomaly 
occurs when there is a perceived difference between observed behaviour and “normal” 
behaviour. Many computer intrusion detection systems are based on anomaly detection. 
A good fraud detection system needs to have a high detection rate while minimising false 
positives. If too few frauds are detected, then the system is not very effective; if there are too 
many false alarms, then they cause time wastage and tendency for people not to take them 
seriously. A notable problem is what is known as the base rate fallacy, a consequence of the 
probabilities involved, which shows that it is very difficult in this type of system to achieve a 
high rate of detections with a low rate of false alarms [8]. 
Rules based fraud detection is usually implemented by some kind of predicate logic that 
works on input data. The main implementation issues for rules based detection are mediation 
of this input data to some standard format, choice of rules engine, and provision of flexible 
tools for specification of arbitrarily complex rules. 
3.4 Specification and maintenance of rules 
Another major design question for rules-based fraud detection systems is how rules are stored 
and edited.  
If fraud detection rules are static then their effectiveness is reduced, firstly as this implies that 
they cannot be tailored to one-off or rapidly changing services, and secondly as perpetrators 
of fraud tend to get to know the rules and develop workarounds. Thus it is paramount that 
rules are easily editable, and are highly customisable, either per-service or per-user. An ideal 
scenario is where the customer is actively involved in rules specification (e.g. “I rarely make 
international calls, and when I do they’re almost always to France”). 
Furthermore, for maximum effectiveness, fraud detection rules should be able to be 
dependent on any input data – i.e. arbitrary choice of IPDR fields and other input data, and it 
should be possible for these rules to be almost arbitrarily complex. Formally, we can write 
this as: 
DetectionResult = f(IPDR fields, HistoricalUsageData, CustomerData), 
where f is an arbitrary, non-linear function. 
The challenge for the implementation of a fraud detection system is to define a representation 
of rules that is flexible and user-friendly, but sufficiently powerful to permit the most 
complex of rules to be captured. Specifically, the representation format must: 
• Be easy to manage (by non-programmers); 
• Permit arbitrarily complex formulae; 
• Allow various input formats. 
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Motivated by experience with rating engine development [9], we propose to satisfy the above 
requirements by providing the user with a spreadsheet-like user interface. Spreadsheet logic, 
such as that of Microsoft Excel, is very flexible and tends to be familiar to personnel in 
finance and revenue assurance functions. As part of service design, usage data is identified to 
be placed into certain cells in a worksheet, and other cells are for the user to enter formulae or 
conditions. Sample usage data can be entered for testing purposes, but actual usage data is 
taken from IPDRs, etc., and placed into the specified positions at runtime, and the rules are 
executed automatically. 
3.5 Deployment 
Deployment issues include distribution of processing, storage (of rules, usage data & 
customer profiles), performance optimisation, and cost. A crucial consideration is whether to 
centralise rules processing, or to have this processing take place close to the edges of the 
network. The latter option may offer superior performance though, if the software 
architecture allows for it, centralised processing can match this by utilising load balancing 
techniques. The main advantage of detecting fraud close to individual devices is that it may 
be easier to trigger a reaction (e.g. cut off the device). The main advantage of centralised 
processing is increased scope for correlation of data from different locations. 
The method used for user profiling has a significant impact on performance, storage and 
memory requirements. At one extreme, we can have simple classification rather than 
individual profiling of users. This minimises the quantity of data to be stored for each 
customer (there may be very many) and may also improve performance by, for example, 
allowing per-customer rules to be stored in memory rather than on disk. At the other extreme, 
we may have highly individualised profiles, for example by allowing each user to define 
his/her own. This approach has the advantage of actively involving the user in fraud 
minimisation. The system could even be configured so that the user receives a personal 
notification when certain events occur that might point towards fraud.  
4 Implementation  
Work is in progress on building a rules based fraud management system. This work builds on 
an existing accounting implementation [10] that applies charges to IPDRs making use of 
widely understood spreadsheet logic for rule specification and processing. Microsoft Excel is 
currently being used for the rules engine, though the architecture is sufficiently flexible to 
allow use of alternative spreadsheet engines. It is possible for example to have users specify 
rules with Excel, but to have rule processing carried out by a potentially more efficient 
engine, such as the Formula One ActiveX control [11]. 
Another feature of the implementation is generation of alerts when fraud is suspected, and 
notification of these alerts to relevant network equipment. 
5 Conclusions and Future Work 
Our work so far has highlighted the problem of fraud detection in emerging converged 
networks, has examined various solution approaches and has proposed an initial design for a 
fraud detection system. Following our software implementation, significant experimental 
work is required in a testbed environment to evaluate approaches to rules specification and a 
variety of issues like cost, performance and storage requirements. A variety of different 
deployment scenarios need to be considered in this. 
As well as examining the performance of our rules specification and management system, 
there is significant need for more work on fraud detection techniques themselves, especially 
their adaptation to emerging multi-service networks. As well as rules based detection, 
experimental work is required to validate alternative techniques, like the use of neural 
networks and other intelligent systems. 
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More generally, in light of the convergence of telecommunications networks and general 
computer networks, it is reasonable to expect the disciplines of telecoms fraud detection and 
network intrusion detection to merge into a single field of study – perhaps called “anomaly 
detection”.  
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